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‡University of Kentucky
(jziliak@uky.edu)

Abstract
We examine trends in employment, earnings and incomes over the last two
decades in the United States, and how the safety net has responded to
changing fortunes, including the shutdown of the economy in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic. The US safety net is a patchwork of different
programmes providing in-kind as well as cash benefits, and it had many
holes prior to the pandemic. In addition, few of the programmes are designed
explicitly as automatic stabilisers. We show that the safety net response
to employment losses in the COVID-19 pandemic largely consists only
of increased support from unemployment insurance and food assistance
programmes, an inadequate response compared with the magnitude of the
downturn. We discuss options to reform social assistance in the United States
to provide more robust income floors in times of economic downturns.
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I. Introduction
The economic havoc wreaked upon the global economy by first the Great
Recession of 2007–09 and now the COVID-19 health pandemic has laid
bare the many holes in the social safety net in the United States. Among
major developed countries, the United States stands alone in its failure to
provide universal health insurance, general cash assistance to the poor, and
entitlement to childcare subsidies, among others. Its patchwork of social
assistance varies greatly across states, and often within states, leaving many
Americans unprotected and vulnerable in periods of economic upheaval. In
this paper, we use two decades of data to examine trends in employment,
earnings and incomes in the United States to examine how the safety net
has responded to changing fortunes, including the Great Recession and the
shutdown of the economy in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.1
We begin by providing a brief overview of social assistance programmes
in the United States, and reforms to those programmes over the last 20
years. Among the plethora of social insurance and means-tested transfers,
few are explicitly designed as automatic stabilisers to confront economic
shocks induced by the likes of the Great Recession and COVID-19. Some
are targeted at specific populations typically outside the labour force, such as
the elderly (e.g. Social Security and Medicare) or children (e.g. school meal
programmes), others are non-entitlement programmes that are rationed and
have fixed budgets (e.g. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and
housing), and still others (e.g. Earned Income Tax Credit) are provided only
in the form of annual tax credits, which are not responsive to downturns. Yet
unemployed individuals in the United States often lose their health insurance,
given the continued large reliance on an employer-based system, and they
often face eviction when they do not pay their rent (a phenomenon that has
received much greater visibility in the United States in the last few years2 ). The
notable exceptions are Unemployment Insurance (UI) and the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), often known as food stamps. However,
eligibility for the first of these programmes is narrowly targeted and the second
is restricted, in many states, to families with limited assets. In addition, while
SNAP is a federal programme, UI is a state programme whose benefits and
coverage vary significantly across states. We also discuss actions taken by the
Congress in the recent downturns to temporarily expand safety net programme
access, funding and generosity, including the Great Recession and the COVID19 pandemic.
To document changing economic need over time and the business cycle,
and the responsiveness of the safety net to that need, we use data for the
1

See Bitler, Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2020) for a related analysis of many of the same issues discussed
in this paper and some similar conclusions.
2
Desmond, 2016.
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period before the pandemic and for the COVID-19 crisis period. For the prepandemic period, we use data from the Current Population Survey Annual
Social and Economic Supplement, and for the COVID-19 crisis period, we
rely on data from the Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey and the
Data Foundation’s COVID Impact Survey. The latter two are new surveys
fielded to provide real-time information on a variety of outcomes induced
by the pandemic.3 For our purposes, we use the Household Pulse Survey for
employment information in 2020, and the COVID Impact Survey provides
transfer programme participation. We show that employment losses of lowand semi-skilled men and women were quite severe at the onset of the COVID19 crisis, and substantially exceeded those losses for most groups experienced
in the Great Recession, but by the third month into the crisis employment
partially rebounded. For much of the last two decades, median earnings of men
and women were stagnant in real terms, except for the last three years leading
up to the pandemic. Median household incomes were likewise flat until 2015,
but there was a further pulling apart at the top of the income distribution such
that 90–10 income inequality increased 22 per cent in the six years after the
Great Recession. With the real growth in earnings among the less skilled after
2015, this inequality retrenched by about 10 per cent. We show that the US
tax system reduces before tax inequality a robust 45 per cent in a typical year;
however, it was only partially successful in slowing down the pace of widening
inequality.
We next document pre-pandemic trends in participation in five major
safety net programmes, including during the Great Recession, and how this
participation has responded to the pandemic. We show that there is strong
secular growth in programme participation, which more than doubles among
semi- and low-skilled men and women, driven chiefly by the Medicaid
programme, but also by food assistance. Among the programmes we examine,
both UI and SNAP served as the main income stabilisers during the Great
Recession, and again in the early months of the COVID-19 economic shock.
The other programmes have shown little buoyancy to economic downturns
over the last two decades.
This lack of automatic stabilisation in much of the US social safety net sets
up our final section where we discuss possible reforms.4 These include adding
automatic triggers to UI, SNAP and TANF for programme eligibility during
3

US Census Bureau, 2020; Wozniak et al., 2020.
We make no attempt to provide a formal definition of what an adequate response would be. The
standard theory of insurance says that, in the absence of adverse selection and moral hazard, intertemporal
consumption should be completely smoothed. No country does this, but instead tries to replace only a
fraction of lost income. For those who are covered by UI, for example, the US replaces about 50 per cent
of prior earnings for a finite number of weeks (see below). The problem in the United States is that the
patchwork nature of the system means that millions of families receive much less than that, and some even
receive zero.
4
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economic downturns, expanding access and benefit amounts for refundable
tax credits, food assistance from SNAP and childcare, restoring some TANF
cash assistance for the poor, and triggering expanded federal financing to
states for Medicaid. The advantage of these automatic triggers over the current
discretionary system of legislative stopgap measures is improved targeting and
efficiency of programme operations, and greater smoothing of incomes and
consumption over the cycle.

II. The structure of the US social safety net
Social assistance in the United States falls into one of two categories:
social insurance or means-tested transfers.5 As a general rule, eligibility
for social insurance programmes is tied to a history of employment or old
age, while means-tested transfers are tied to having currently low income
and assets. The former includes Social Security Retirement and Survivors
Benefits (the country’s retirement programme), Disability Insurance (the US
programme for the disabled with strong work histories), Medicare (the medical
care programme for the disabled and elderly), Unemployment Insurance,
and Workers Compensation. Means-tested transfers include, among others,
Medicaid (medical programme for families and individuals), Supplemental
Security Income (SSI; a cash welfare programme for the elderly, blind and
disabled), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF; cash assistance
and non-cash for families with children), subsidised housing assistance,
childcare subsidies, and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP), which provides vouchers to families and individuals for food
purchases. The other key means-tested programmes that are directly tied to
employment are two tax credits: the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and
the Child Tax Credit (CTC).
In terms of aggregate expenditure, that on Medicare, Medicaid and Social
Security dwarfs all others, and with TANF the smallest among all major
programmes.6 In addition, as shown by Moffitt and Ziliak (2019), almost all
the major programmes in the safety net have experienced substantial secular
growth in real spending over the last four decades, with the exception of UI and
TANF. In 2017, they accounted for 12.3 per cent of the nation’s GDP. However,
eligibility for the programmes is scattershot, with some covering only the
elderly, disabled or retired, others covering only those with long histories
of earnings or significant levels of current earnings, many often primarily
5
Detailed reviews of the history and current status of US safety net programmes and the research that
has been conducted on those programmes can be found in Moffitt (2016). Short summaries of each major
programme, as well as proposals for reform, can be found in the papers published in the November 2019
volume of the ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, a number of which are
referenced in this paper.
6
See Table 22.1 of Ben-Shalom, Moffitt and Scholz (2012).
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intended for families with children, and others (such as TANF, housing,
and childcare subsidies) with capped expenditures that result in rationing
of slots.7 As a consequence, among all very-low-income non-disabled nonelderly families in the country, fewer than half receive benefits from any major
programme at all and, among childless families, only about 20–25 per cent do.8
Despite the strong secular growth in spending, most of the programmes
in the safety net are not automatic stabilisers designed to respond to cyclical
shocks, such as those associated with the Great Recession and the COVID19 health pandemic. Social insurance programmes for retirees and the
disabled, for example, do not provide assistance to most of those affected
by an economic downturn (nor were they designed to).9 But means-tested
programmes, because they are intended to provide support to those with low
income, should be expected to kick in when earnings decline, though that is
far from the case under the current programme structure and operations.
Housing assistance is not an entitlement programme and the vast majority
who are income-eligible do not receive assistance in the first place. TANF
is also not an entitlement, and requires the presence of dependent children
in the family. It also has work requirements, which cannot be fully relaxed
during recessions without Congressional approval. Medicaid historically has
required the presence of young children for eligibility among the non-disabled
and non-elderly. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
expanded eligibility to childless adults but at state discretion and, as of 2020,
only 37 states and the District of Columbia have expanded Medicaid to cover
that group. The majority of states that did not expand Medicaid are located
in the South, with populations that have above average shares of black and
Hispanic populations, perpetuating racial disparities in health care access.10
The EITC provides a refundable tax credit to workers, but only annually, and
hence it will provide support to those affected by the pandemic recession
only in Spring 2021. Moreover, increased EITC benefits will only accrue
to those whose earnings are reduced from high earnings ranges down to an
intermediate earnings range, who will therefore get more benefits than they
would have, had the recession not occurred. Those who are laid off or have
7

Again, see Table 22.1 of Ben-Shalom et al. (2012) for a listing of eligible groups for each major
programme.
8
See Table 1 of Kosar and Moffitt (2017).
9
While there is some evidence of a cyclical component to Disability Insurance (Maestas, 2019), that
programme is designed to replace the earnings of those who suffer a disability that is expected to result in
a loss of gainful employment of at least a year, and usually permanently, and as such should have no direct
relationship with the state of the business cycle.
10
In fact, because the US system of health insurance provision is still primarily employer-based, the
reduction in employment that comes during a recession typically results in loss of health insurance for
many families. For the COVID-19 pandemic, Garrett and Gangopadhyaya (2020) have estimated that if
the unemployment rate reaches 15 per cent, over 17 million workers will lose employer health insurance
coverage.
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earnings reduced to low earnings levels will, to the contrary, receive reduced
tax credits.11 Some evidence suggests that the programme does provide
insurance over the cycle for dual-earning families when the secondary worker
has reduced earnings, but not for single-parent families who comprise over 80
per cent of EITC recipients.12
There are only two major US safety net programmes that provide
substantial and meaningful support during downturns, and these are the UI
and SNAP programmes. We devote a short discussion to each.
Among social insurance programmes, only UI is specifically targeted
to assist workers from economic recessions. Like most UI programmes in
industrialised countries,13 the US UI programme provides benefits to the
involuntarily unemployed who meet requirements related to past earnings
in an UI-eligible job, who are paid a benefit that is a fraction of past wages
for a certain maximum duration, and who must meet certain job search
requirements. As in all countries, these restrictions mean that only a fraction
of the unemployed are covered (the voluntarily unemployed and those with
short work histories are not, for example); even in the Great Recession, it was
only 40 per cent.14 The US replacement rate is in about the middle of the pack
among other countries but it has one of the shorter maximum durations. It also
typically does not cover part-time workers, the self-employed or independent
contractors.
However, the major difference between the US programme and that in
other countries is the state-based organisation of the system and its method of
financing, as contrasted with the national organisation and financing in most
other countries.15 The ability of states to set the parameters of the programme
means that many of those parameters often vary widely (e.g., replacement
rates range from 30 to 55 per cent16 ). However, more important, states have
to raise their own revenues to support the programme and they do so by
building up rainy day ‘trust funds’ for future downturns, using a complicated
tax on employers, which is loosely related to their record of UI recipients.
When recessions occur, states run down their trust funds and, in a severe
recession, they have to borrow money from the federal government and pay
it back later. After the Great Recession, states had to rebuild their trust funds
either by raising taxes or cutting benefits, or by restricting eligibility, and
many did the latter.17 Some states lowered the maximum duration down to
a very low 13 weeks, only half of the normal 26. Many states also tightened
11

Larrimore, Mortenson and Splinter, 2016.
Jones, 2017; Bitler, Hoynes and Kuka, 2017.
13
Moffitt, 2014.
14
von Wachter, 2019.
15
See Vroman and Woodbury (2014) for details on the US system.
16
Stone and Chen, 2014.
17
Vroman and Woodbury, 2014; von Wachter, 2019.
12
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up their eligibility restrictions, which led to a decline of the fraction of the
unemployed receiving UI benefits to an average of 28 per cent shortly before
the pandemic, the lowest level in 45 years.18 Thus, the UI system was trending
in an unfavourable direction even prior to 2020.
This peculiar method of financing UI leads to the other important feature of
the programme relevant to recession relief. While there is a special programme
that triggers modest extra federal benefits for states if their unemployment
rate rises above certain levels,19 this is not sufficient to address the needs of
the unemployed in a major recession, so Congress typically enacts additional,
temporary federal benefits with ad hoc legislation. It did so in the recessions
in the early 1970s, mid-1970s, early 1980s, 1990s, early 2000s, and in the
Great Recession.20 The legislation is often hastily put together because of the
emergency nature of the situation and, even after enactment, there are weeks
of delay before benefits start to flow. Economists have long criticised the lack
of an automatic system instead, and we do so as well in Section VII.
The means-tested transfer programme that most closely resembles an
automatic stabiliser is SNAP.21 The programme provides a monthly allotment
for the purchase of food that varies by household size, but is fixed
nationally (with a top-up for residents of Alaska and Hawaii). It is not a
cash programme because benefits must be spent on food purchased from
qualified vendors for preparation and consumption in the home. However,
the distinctiveness of the programme compared with the others in the United
States is that eligibility is near-universal, with eligibility extended to families
and individuals regardless of marital status, the presence of children, or other
demographic characteristics, as long as income and asset conditions are met.
Unlike a number of other programmes, it is federally financed and is an
entitlement, with all those eligible legally entitled to benefits.
There are a few restrictions in the programme relevant to recession relief.
One is that the programme does have asset tests and the asset limit at the
federal level is only $2,250, which would make almost all working families
except for the poorest of the poor ineligible for the programme if they become
unemployed. However, beginning in the 2000s, states were allowed to have the
authority to relax these limits and a growing number have done so, with some
eliminating asset tests entirely.22 A second restriction is that childless adults
who do not have a disability must meet work requirements in the programme.
These can be relaxed if the unemployment rate rises above certain levels and

18

See Figure 2 of von Wachter (2019).
This is the so-called Extended Benefits programme. States typically pay half of the cost but Congress
has, in the past, temporarily paid all of it.
20
See Whittaker and Isaacs (2013) for the history.
21
Ziliak, 2015; Ganong and Liebman, 2018.
22
US Congressional Research Service, 2019.
19
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the state requests that the requirement be temporarily suspended, and this is
often done in major recessions.
Finally, a few remarks are merited about how the US safety net compares
with most other OECD countries, including the United Kingdom. First, the
United States offers no universal health insurance, which is standard in the
OECD. Persons aged 65 and older are covered under Medicare, but for the
non-elderly, health insurance is most often tied to their employment. Firms are
under no mandate to provide such coverage and there has been a long secular
decline in employer coverage from 67 per cent in 1998 to 58 per cent in
2018.23,24 Thus, as of 2018, over 10 per cent of the non-elderly US population
remain without health coverage.25 Second, the US does not provide general
income support to the low-income non-disabled, non-elderly population.
The former programme, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, did offer
general assistance to low-income families with children under age 18. While
the work requirements for single-parent (mostly mothers) families were de
minimis, they were much more stringent for two-parent families and thus
the programme mainly served lone-mother families.26 The programme was
replaced by TANF as part of the 1996 welfare reform, whereby the programme
was stripped of its entitlement status and eligibility was severely curtained
such that participation among families with children in poverty fell from 7 in
10 to 2.5 in 10.27 Income support for non-disabled non-elderly adults without
dependent children has never been provided at any meaningful level, and this
population is only eligible for a very small work-conditioned tax credit and
must meet strict work requirements for eligibility for food assistance from
SNAP.
Third, the US offers little in the way of childcare assistance compared
with other OECD countries. Childcare is not an entitlement for low-income
families, and thus the vast majority receive no assistance, even though centrebased care can eat up one-fifth of earnings of the typical single-mother
family.28 There are tax credits available to offset some child-rearing costs, but
most benefits accrue to middle- and high-income families. Fourth, housing
assistance in the United States is strictly curtailed, in recent years serving
under 3 per cent of the population compared with, for example, 16 per cent
of the population in England.29 Fifth, as noted previously, the US UI system
is disadvantaged by its state-level financing structure, which makes it less
responsive to recessions than in most OECD countries.
23

Rae et al., 2020.
Under the ACA, firms with 50 or more employees are required to offer insurance to at least 95 per cent
of their full-time workforce or are subject to penalties from the Internal Revenue Service.
25
Tolbert, Orgera and Singer, 2019.
26
Moffitt, 1992.
27
Bitler and Hoynes, 2016b.
28
Ziliak, 2014; Hotz and Wiswall, 2019.
29
Adam et al., 2015; Collinson, Ellen and Ludwig, 2019.
24
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In summary, while the safety net in the United States is very large and has
grown considerably over time in terms of the number of persons served and
in inflation-adjusted spending, the patchwork of programmes is generally not
designed to respond as well to changes in the macro economy as would be
desired.

III. The Great Recession and COVID-19 policy responses
The most recent major recession in the United States prior to the current
one was the Great Recession, which took place approximately in the 2007–
2011 period, with unemployment peaking at approximately 10 per cent and
coming down very slowly, reaching pre-recession levels only in 2017. Through
a series of pieces of legislation, the US Congress enacted a number of major
forms of temporary safety net relief.30 UI was greatly extended, reaching a
maximum of 99 weeks of benefit eligibility at the peak. Maximum benefits
in the SNAP programme were increased by 13 per cent, EITC benefits were
extended for families with three or more qualifying members, the share of
Medicaid expenses paid by the federal government was increased, emergency
supplementary funds for the TANF programme were provided, millions of
dollars were appropriated in additional housing assistance, a one-time payment
was given to Social Security and Disability recipients, and funds were provided
for childcare assistance. A temporary reduction in the payroll tax was enacted.
The magnitude of the response provided major monetary assistance to the
lower part of the income distribution and, rather astonishingly, kept the poverty
rate from rising at all in its early period.31
The US policy response to the pandemic recession has been much narrower
than in the Great Recession, although more generous in the programmes it
has focused on, at least in the short term. Unlike in the Great Recession,
Congress has provided little additional support for most means-tested and
social insurance programmes. SNAP benefits were increased temporarily but
only for those whose benefit amounts were below the maximum (40 per cent
of recipients are already at the maximum and hence received no additional
support). The federal share of Medicaid expenditures has been increased by
only 6 percentage points, and that is to last until the health emergency ends.
Support for rental assistance through housing vouchers was increased only
by under 6 per cent. However, as in the Great Recession, work requirements
for certain SNAP recipients have been temporarily suspended, and additional
funds have been provided for summer Head Start programmes and state
childcare funds. But funding and eligibility rules for the other means-tested
programmes in the safety net, including the EITC, TANF, SSI, and subsidised
housing programmes, have largely remained at their pre-pandemic levels.
30
31

Burtless and Gordon, 2011.
See Sherman (2011) and Moffitt (2013); see also Bitler and Hoynes (2016a).
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However, two other responses, both short-term in nature, exceeded those
in the Great Recession. First, a one-time cash payment was enacted to almost
all families with incomes below fairly high levels, equal to $1,200 per adult,
$2,400 for a married couple, and $500 for each qualifying child under age
17. While one-time in character, and hence of diminishing impact if not
renewed, this represents a much more universal cash supplement than anything
considered in the Great Recession. Second, Congress enacted three major
forms of UI relief. One was to provide any worker qualifying for state UI
benefits an additional $600 per week funded by the federal government. As
the average state weekly benefit amount is around $300, this tripled weekly
UI income for the typical unemployed worker. Ganong, Noel and Vavra
(2020) have estimated that income under the expanded UI programme raised
incomes over pre-pandemic earnings for two-thirds of UI recipients. But
this programme expired on 31 July 2020, and at this writing has not been
renewed despite continued record high numbers of unemployed.32 Second, an
additional 13 weeks of benefits was added to whatever the state maximum
currently is. A third innovation was the creation of an additional programme
that extended UI to self-employed workers, independent contractors (including
so-called gig economy workers), those with short work histories, and those
looking for part-time work. As noted previously, most of these individuals are
not covered under the regular UI program. The pandemic programme provides
a minimum weekly benefit based on the state’s programme and can be received
for up to 39 weeks through to the end of 2020.33
In the following sections, we chart trends in employment, earnings, income
and – most important for the topic of this paper – safety net programme
participation, both before and during the initial months of the COVID19 pandemic. We then follow this up with descriptive regressions showing
the relationship between state business cycles and programme participation,
conditional on a host of socio-economic characteristics, and whether the link
between the economy and programme participation changed after the COVID
period.

IV. Data
The data for our analysis span the recession of 2001, the Great Recession of
2007–09, and the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Data for the preCOVID-19 period come from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual
32
The US President has recently issued an executive order offering states a $300 weekly supplement, but
only under certain conditions, financed by pulling funds out of emergency trust funds. As of this writing,
11 states have accepted the offer. The duration of the supplement has not been determined and depends on
when the fixed dollar amount allocated to the effort expires.
33
These newly eligible recipients also received the additional $600 per week given to all UI recipients,
which expired on 31 July 2020.
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Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) for the 2001–19 survey years. The
ASEC, which is collected by the US Census Bureau as a supplement to the
monthly labour force statistics from the CPS, serves as the official source
of income and poverty statistics. It consists of about 90,000 households and
roughly 200,000 individuals in a typical year, with some interviewed in person
and others via telephone. Separate weights are provided to make the sample
nationally representative at the person, family and household levels.34
Data for the COVID-19 period come from two sources: the Census
Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey (Pulse) and the Data Foundation’s COVID
Impact Survey (CIS). The Pulse is a large, web-based survey of adults aged
18 and older collected by the Census Bureau to provide timely information on
how the pandemic initially affected employment, food security, health, housing
and education (but not programme participation). Data are aggregated weekly
and we use weeks 1, 4 and 7, referring to the months of April, May and June
2020, with sample sizes ranging from 74,000 to 130,000. Weights are provided
to make the weekly samples nationally representative of adults. The CIS is
a web- and phone-based survey of adults aged 18 and older, also started in
response to the COVID-19 health pandemic.35 It is collected by the NORC
at the University of Chicago and contains information on civic engagement,
current employment and health status, transfer programme participation, and
actions taken in response to COVID-19. Like the Pulse, the CIS is fielded
weekly with just under 9,000 observations in a typical week – a relatively small
sample size to measure safety-net programme participation – and separate
weights are provided to make each weekly sample nationally representative;
alternatively, the samples can be combined and weighted to the national
population. We use weeks 1–3 to overlap with the sample period used in the
Pulse.36
Focal outcomes and their reference periods

Our focal outcomes are employment per population, earnings, household
income before and after taxes, and transfer programme participation, with the
last of these most directly addressing the issue of safety-net accuracy, with
which this paper is concerned. Employment, earnings and transfer programme
participation are each available at the individual level in the ASEC, and thus
we present series separately for men and women, and by education attainment,

34
The Census Bureau defines a family as two or more persons related by birth, marriage or adoption,
and it does not include cohabiting partners. The household includes all persons residing in the household,
regardless of relationship.
35
Wozniak et al., 2020.
36
The CIS only covers ten large states and eight metropolitan statistical areas. We recomputed all CPS
statistics for that subset of states and found no differences in trends.
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race/ethnicity and poverty status within each gender.37 Both the Pulse and CIS
ask about employment status, but because of the large samples from the Pulse
we use that survey for employment in order to capture the monthly dynamics
over the spring season. The reference period for employment in the Pulse is the
prior seven days, and thus to better align the series we use the corresponding
survey-week employment measure in the ASEC. Earnings are only available
in the ASEC, and refer to the prior calendar year. Likewise, household income
is only continuously measured in the ASEC and refers to the prior year. The
before-tax measure of household income includes most forms of labour and
non-labour cash income, but does not include capital gains or losses, or inkind transfers such as SNAP or Medicaid. The after-tax measure of household
income includes the amount of SNAP benefits received in the prior year, and
subtracts federal, state and payroll taxes, while adding back refundable EITC
and CTC tax credits.38
We focus on the two programmes in the safety net most likely to be
responsive to changes in employment – UI and SNAP – but we also include
Medicaid, TANF and SSI, which are asked about in both the ASEC and the
CIS (the Pulse did not ask programme participation questions).39 But we are
not able to match the reference periods for participation in these programmes
in the ASEC and the CIS, because the former only asks about participation
in the past calendar year and the latter only asks about participation in the
survey week. We shall refer to the effect this non-comparability has on our
results, but because participation in a full calendar year will always be greater
than participation in a particular week, the 2020 pandemic participation rate
estimates from the CIS will necessarily tend to be somewhat lower than those
in the ASEC.
Measurement challenges

Beyond the discrepancy in the reference period, there are two additional
measurement challenges affecting both the ASEC and CIS. A well-known
concern with surveys in general, and the ASEC in particular, is underreporting of programme participation, mostly from respondents reporting

37
SNAP receipt in the ASEC is measured at the household level, but we assign participation to each
member of the household under the assumption of resource sharing.
38
Tax payments and credits are estimated using the National Bureau of Economic Research’s TAXSIM
program, found at http://users.nber.org/∼taxsim/. We use version 27, and code used to prepare the ASEC
sample is available at https://sites.google.com/site/jamesziliak/Home/Research. Both the Pulse and CIS ask
about household income in 2019, but only in wide bins and they do not contain enough information on
household relationships to accurately estimate tax liabilities.
39
None of the surveys asks questions about receipt of the EITC or CTC, and participation among those
estimated to be eligible is assumed to be 100 per cent in TAXSIM. Thus, we include these credits in the
after-tax household income series but do not separately examine participation over time in the tax credits.
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non-participation when in fact they did participate.40 To address underreporting, we use a model-based approach to predict programme participation
as a rich function of household demographics.41 We then randomly assign
participation to those non-participants with a high ex ante predicted
probability of participation, until the population-weighted participation
counts align with administrative totals.42 We then assign the average state-byyear benefit amount among recipients to those individuals, and re-compute
household income. Because administrative totals are available with a lag,
we only make this under-reporting adjustment to the ASEC data covering
calendar years 2000–18.
Unfortunately, because the CIS is a new resource and there are not yet
administrative records available to assess its reporting accuracy, there have
been no analyses verifying how responses align with administrative records.
However, given the evidence that most existing surveys under-report transfer
participation, we expect the CIS to suffer from this measurement challenge
as well. This means that, in addition to differences in reference period, our
estimates of programme participation from the CIS are likely understated
compared with what we might expect in the ASEC when those data become
available in 2021.43
All three surveys conduct some data imputation prior to public release.
The Census Bureau imputes missing data on individual questions on the
ASEC using what is known as the ‘hot-deck’ procedure, whereby observations
with missing information are assigned the values from a randomly matched
‘donor’ based on a set of observed demographic characteristics. Notably, some
monthly CPS sample members refuse to answer any or enough questions on
the ASEC to be useable so these households receive a complete imputed
record from a donor using a similar hot-deck imputation procedure. Bollinger
et al. (2019) show that rates of supplement non-response have been on the
rise in recent years, with nearly 25 per cent of all households receiving a
completely imputed ASEC record by 2018. The Census Bureau only does
a limited amount of imputation on demographic characteristics in the Pulse,
using a pared-down hot-deck procedure akin to that employed in the ASEC.
The CIS assigns missing values using an iterative raking procedure based
on age, gender, census division, race and ethnicity, education, and county
40

Meyer, Mok and Sullivan, 2015.
Moffitt and Pauley, 2018.
42
The administrative totals we match are adult participants in each programme aged 18 and older, and
thus we use an expanded ASEC sample of persons aged 18 and older in order to match administrative
counts.
43
The CIS question asks about safety net programmes in a single question, with possibly confusing
programme names, and is likely to have random reporting error, as we discuss in the text. As noted
previously, however, we adjust for systematic under-reporting by adjusting to control totals, but only in
the ASEC.
41
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groupings. Imputation flags are made available in both the ASEC and Pulse,
but not the CIS. Consequently, we retain imputed values of individual variables
in the three surveys, but we drop those ASEC households who have their entire
supplement imputed.44
In order to abstract from most post-secondary education and retirement
decisions, we select a sample of prime age adults aged 25–54 from each
survey. This yields over 1.6 million observations across 19 years in the ASEC,
130,492 observations across three weeks of the Pulse, and 3,454 observations
from three weeks of the CIS. Because we are interested in heterogeneity across
different population groups, we pool the three weeks of the CIS data in order to
minimise sampling variation. This means we provide three separate snapshots
of weekly employment in 2020 from the Pulse, but only a single snapshot of
transfer programme participation in 2020 from the CIS.

V. Labour market impact of COVID-19
We begin by documenting trends in labour market outcomes in the two decades
leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic. Figure 1 shows national trends in
the monthly unemployment rate and the employment–population ratio for
men and women from January 2000 to July 2020.45 The unemployment
rate series shows two US recessions prior to 2020, one modest recession in
the early 2000s and the major recession in the 2007–09 period (the Great
Recession). The pandemic downturn shows up as a jump in the second-quarter
unemployment rate in 2020, reaching a level above that in almost all of the
months of the Great Recession, and a sharp decline in the employment–
population ratio (both exhibit a small bounce-back from the initial drop).
By this measure, the pandemic downturn is more severe than that of the
Great Recession. Also, as noted elsewhere,46 whereas in past recessions
the unemployment rate for men has risen more than that for women, the
opposite is the case for the pandemic, where women’s unemployment has
risen slightly more. Alon et al. (2020) attribute this to the particular sectors
affected by the pandemic (e.g. restaurants and childcare) and to school
closures.
The employment–population ratio shows a smaller cyclical response than
the unemployment rate because the downturns mostly reflect a decrease in
employment, not labour force participation. Whereas we again see that, in
past recessions, male employment has declined more than that of women, they

44
The whole supplement imputes are retained for the adjustment for under-reporting of transfer
programmes in order to match population weighted totals to administrative counts.
45
The data in Figure 1 represent non-seasonally adjusted monthly employment and unemployment data
on persons aged 25–54 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://data.bls.gov/PDQWeb/ln.
46
Alon et al., 2020.
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FIGURE 1
Trends in unemployment rates and employment per population

Source: Authors’ calculations of non-seasonally adjusted monthly employment and unemployment data on
persons aged 25–54 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (https://data.bls.gov/PDQWeb/ln). Shaded areas
in the figure represent recessions as officially designated by the National Bureau of Economic Research
Business Cycle Dating Committee (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html).

declined by about the same amount in the pandemic. Figure 1 also shows a
long-term downward trend in the employment–population ratio, reflecting a
decline in labour force participation for both men and women.
We use the ASEC and the two pandemic surveys to explore these trends
at the individual level. To explore their heterogeneity, we consider three
separate splits based on education, race and ethnicity, and household poverty
status. With our focus on transfer programme receipt, our main interest is in
the labour market experiences of more disadvantaged groups. The education
groups are those with 15 or fewer years of schooling (high school graduates
and dropouts, along with those with some college), and those with 16 or more
© 2020 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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years of schooling (including college and post-graduate degrees). The Census
Bureau distinguishes Hispanic ethnicity from other ethnicities, and thus our
racial groups are non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and non-Hispanic
other race, the latter including Asian, Native American, Hawaiian, and Pacific
Islanders. Poverty status is determined by whether household income in the
prior calendar year is below or above two times the federal poverty line for
that household size.47
Figure 2 presents trends in employment of men and women aged 25–54
as a share of their respective populations. The figure shows that the effects
of both the Great Recession, and especially COVID-19, were not neutral with
respect to education, race and poverty status. For education, both men and
women with lower levels of education had much more sizeable reductions
in employment in the Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic than
those with more education. Interestingly, compared with Figure 1, we see that
women’s employment fell less than that for men for the less educated as well
as for the more educated. For men, these employment losses were sufficiently
acute with the onset of COVID-19 that the gap in employment rates between
high-skilled and low-skilled men doubled between the 2001 recession and the
COVID-19 pandemic.
As for race and ethnicity, black men had sharper employment losses in the
Great Recession than white or Hispanic men, but Hispanic men took a bigger
employment hit during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, falling
23 percentage points compared with 16 points for black men. For women,
the decline in employment for black women was much larger than for other
groups.48 As for differences by household income stratum, men residing in
households with low incomes likewise experienced much greater employment
losses in all three recessions since 2000 than those in high-income households.
The patterns are quite similar among women. The exceptions are that female
employment rates were little affected over the Great Recession, and while
there has been a slight trend of reduction in employment among prime-age
low- and semi-skilled men, it has been much sharper among women in the
years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic. The other important difference
in male and female employment is among the races. Black men have the lowest
employment rates, while Hispanic women have the lowest rates. Notably, with
the exception of college-educated men and women, there has been a partial
recovery in employment by June 2020.

47
Income to needs is found by dividing household income by the household-size specific poverty
threshold. In the ASEC, income is continuously measured, but the Pulse and CIS only release income
in bins. We thus assign the mid-point of the bin to the household before dividing by the poverty threshold.
The poverty thresholds are fixed over time except for an inflation adjustment.
48
The graphs also show much smaller differences in women’s employment by race and ethnicity than in
men’s. It has previously been found that racial differences for women are smaller than those for men.
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FIGURE 2
Employment per population by education, race, and poverty status

Source: Authors’ calculations of 2001–19 ACES and Weeks 1, 4 and 7 of the Pulse. Results weighted using
person weights.

Figure 3 depicts trends in median real weekly earnings of working men and
women, found by dividing earnings in the prior year by the number of weeks
worked and adjusting for inflation using the personal consumption expenditure
deflator with 2010 base year (workers only). Most notable in Figure 3 is the
stability of median earnings for both men and women across education, race
and household poverty status. This is true at least until 2015, when there were
real gains in earnings among less-skilled men and women, men of white and
other races and Hispanic ethnicity, women of all races and Hispanic ethnicity,
and those in households with incomes above twice the poverty line. Given the
steep employment losses among these same groups of pre-pandemic earnings
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FIGURE 3
Median real weekly earnings

Source: Authors’ calculations of 2001–19 ASEC. Results weighted using person weights.

gainers denoted in Figure 1, the expectation is that unconditional earnings
losses for these groups (i.e. earnings inclusive of job losers) will also be
sharp.49
We move beyond individual employment and earnings in Figure 4 where
we present median real household income both before and after taxes and
inclusion of near-cash benefits from SNAP, but only up to 2019 as we have no
comparable 2020 values. We still show variation in incomes by education, race
and ethnicity, and poverty status by selecting the relevant characteristic of the
49
Earnings conditional on those retaining work may not fall in response to COVID-19. This information
for calendar year 2020 from the ASEC will not be available until autumn 2021.
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FIGURE 4
Median real household income

Source: Authors’ calculations of 2001–19 ASEC. Results weighted using household weights.

household head, but we also add a fourth panel based on employment status
of the head. Before-tax incomes for the typical household whose household
head had some college education or less fell over the sample period, especially
after the Great Recession. These households nearly recovered those losses
after 2015, so that by 2018 their incomes returned to about the same level
as in 2000. Income gains after 2015 among the high skilled, households
headed by a white person or person of other races, and those not in near
poverty were strong enough to result in the first real gains in two decades.
Accounting for taxes and SNAP only has the effect of reducing the level of
household incomes, but not the basic trends, beyond a slight slowing down
of those trends. This is true also for household income inequality, as seen
in Figure 5, which shows the 90–10 income ratio of before-tax and aftertax household incomes. On average, over the sample period, the tax system
reduced household income inequality by a sizeable 45 per cent. However,
from the Great Recession to 2015, before-tax inequality increased 22 per
cent, and while the tax system slowed that rate down, post-tax inequality
increased 14 per cent. After 2015, before-tax inequality fell 10 per cent,
but after-tax inequality was little changed, pulling back only 2 per cent.
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FIGURE 5
Household income inequality

Source: Authors’ calculations of 2001–19 ASEC. Results weighted using household weights.

Based on the employment trends showing substantial losses among the less
skilled, we anticipate a sharp increase in earnings inequality in 2020, reversing
the trends of recent years. However, as we discuss below, the inclusion
of social assistance from unemployment compensation is likely to stabilise
before-tax income inequality. Because the Trump administration’s tax cuts of
2017 were heavily skewed toward high-income taxpayers, however, after-tax
inequality may actually worsen, as hinted by the increase in 2018 shown in
Figure 5.

VI. Transfer programme participation over time and the cycle
In this section, we document how the US social safety net responds to
changes in employment and incomes over time and the business cycle. As
noted previously, Sherman (2011) and Moffitt (2013) found strong safety
net responses in the Great Recession. Bitler and Hoynes (2016a) examined
whether those responses were consistent with prior recessions per unit increase
in the unemployment rate, finding that Great Recession UI responses were in
excess of historical experience, while SNAP responses were not statistically
© 2020 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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FIGURE 6
Participation rates in social assistance programmes

Source: Authors’ calculations of 2001–19 ASEC and Weeks 1–3 of the CIS. Social assistance programmes
include UI, Medicaid, SNAP, TANF and SSI. Results weighted using person weights.

different per unit of past experience.50 We compare historical participation
rates with those in the pandemic.
We first present overall participation rates in the aggregate (i.e. over all
five programmes that we examine) and then by education attainment. This is
then followed up with descriptive regressions of programme participation as a
function of demographic characteristics and the state labour market.
Figure 6 shows the fraction of men and women aged 25–54 receiving
any assistance from UI, Medicaid, SNAP, TANF or SSI over the last 20
years, including the first few months of the COVID-19 crisis in 2020, along
with trends in each of the individual programmes. The figure shows that the
participation rate in any assistance programme resembles a step function, with
steps up at the onset of the Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic.
Participation held steady at around 15 per cent prior to the Great Recession,
and then jumped about 7 percentage points during the recession but did not
come down to pre-recession levels afterwards. Instead, participation grew
50

See also Ziliak (2015) and Ganong and Liebman (2018).
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modestly but steadily over the next decade. This reflects the long-term upward
trend growth in safety net participation referred to in the Introduction. Overall
participation in the five programmes then jumped another 10 percentage
points, to just under 35 per cent with the onset of the pandemic. Given the
change in definition of programme participation in the pre-2020 data and the
2020 data referred to earlier, this jump is likely to be an underestimate of the
true increase.51 Thus, we find that the increase in safety net participation in
these first few months of the pandemic exceeded that in the Great Recession.52
The increase during the pandemic was driven by the sharp uptick in UI
and SNAP, as expected, with no obvious response of TANF and SSI. The
jump in UI receipt slightly exceeds that in the Great Recession while the
SNAP jump is approximately the same.53 However, there also appears to be
a jump in Medicaid during the pandemic that was not observed during the
Great Recession. To be certain, Medicaid growth over time reflects secular
expansion, which accelerated after the 2014 ACA.54 The fact that there might
be a business cycle jump in Medicaid in the COVID-19 period not observed
in previous recessions could stem in part from the fact that the ACA expanded
coverage for the first time to low-income non-disabled childless adults (at least
in some states) and, as Figure 2 suggests, employment losses in 2020 were
quite severe for this population.55
In Figure 7, we present trends in participation rates overall and for
individual programmes by educational attainment. The figure makes clear
the relationship of programme participation to the overall state of the macro
economy, with participation responses greatest among semi- and lower-skilled
workers. UI shows a modest increase during the mild recession of 2001, but
with a sharp increase with the Great Recession and even more so during
the recession resulting from COVID-19.56 However, UI receipt rates for the
51

As we noted earlier, we expect the 2020 participation estimates to be on the conservative side because
they reflect participation in the prior seven days at different weeks between April and June 2020, whereas
the ASEC estimates refer to any participation in the prior year. We cannot rule out, however, that some of
the difference could stem from different sampling frames between the ASEC and CIS.
52
Whether they exceed the Great Recession experience per unit of the unemployment rate is a different
question, because the rate has jumped up more in the pandemic than it did in the Great Recession. See our
discussion of this issue in the text. We should also note that there were many more increases in other safety
net programmes in the Great Recession than there have been in the pandemic, however; see the discussion
in the text.
53
We should note that a number of other reports of UI during the pandemic report increases in the
number of claims rather than receipt, which can be quite problematic; see von Wachter (2020), another
paper in this issue. The CIS asked respondents if they had applied for UI as well as whether they received
it. Our tabulations of the 2020 UI participation rates in Figure 6 double when we include applications.
54
Currie and Duque, 2019.
55
We produced a complete set of figures using data as reported in the ASEC without the adjustment for
under-reporting. This adjustment has the effect of slightly increasing the levels of participation, but has no
effect on the trends presented in the figures in the paper.
56
In results not presented, we constructed the series separately for men and women by skills. Notably,
the amplitudes of UI participation among women were more muted in the 2001 and 2007–09 recessions,
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FIGURE 7
Participation rates in social assistance programmes by education attainment

Source: Authors’ calculations of 2001–19 ASEC and Weeks 1–3 of the CIS. Results weighted using person
weights.

unemployed are far below 1, even during the pandemic. This reflects the
continued incomplete coverage of the programme discussed above, even after
the expansions of UI eligibility provided for in the pandemic legislation.57 The
figure also shows a huge response of SNAP to the Great Recession among
men and women with some college education or less, but this participation
expansion lasted well beyond the official end of the recession. Prior studies
showed that the business cycle was the primary driver of programme growth
during that decade, though there were also a number of policies adopted at
the state level that eased access and recertification of programme benefits.58
Consistent with the earnings growth starting in 2015, SNAP participation fell
in the years leading up to the pandemic. Then we see a very sharp uptick in

but UI participation among less-skilled women in the COVID-19 period has been even stronger than among
less-skilled men, consistent with the shutdown of work in the hospitality and entertainment sectors where
these women are more concentrated.
57
See Bitler et al. (2020) for a more detailed discussion of incomplete UI coverage in the pandemic.
58
Ziliak, 2015; Ganong and Liebman, 2018.
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participation among the semi- and less-skilled during the pandemic, to rates
that slightly exceed the record highs of the Great Recession.59
Figure 7 also shows the huge secular growth in the Medicaid programme
that affected both the skilled and less skilled. Participation rates among those
with some college education or less tripled to over 30 per cent in the last
two decades, but this rate of growth was even higher among the college
educated, albeit from a much smaller base participation rate in 2000. The latter
speaks to the weakness in the labour market, and secular loss in employerprovided insurance. There is no detectable response of Medicaid, TANF or SSI
participation to the 2001 recession or the Great Recession, with the possible
exception of a very mild uptick in TANF among the less skilled in the Great
Recession. In the pandemic, however, we see more pronounced evidence of
a cyclical response among the semi- and less-skilled in both Medicaid and
TANF. This underscores the fact that Medicaid appears to be reaching new
populations in a programme heretofore not affected as much by the humps
and bumps of the business cycle. The fact that TANF also increased in the
pandemic among those with some college education or less could reflect just
how deeply the crisis has cut into the employment opportunities for those
in the hospitality and entertainment sectors, but it should also be noted that
the TANF participation rates are extremely small compared with the other
programmes in the figure and, in comparison, is visually barely detectable
(see Figure 6). Finally, SSI experienced trend growth among the semi- and
less-skilled from 2000 to 2014, but then stabilised thereafter. Although there
is a marked increase in SSI receipt among the skilled during the pandemic,
this is to a very low level and we are less confident that this a real programme
response.60
We summarise these business-cycle responses with a series of descriptive
weighted probit regressions, using the person weights provided in each
survey. For all programmes combined, and each one individually, we regress
programme participation on indicators for age (ages 45–54 omitted), gender,
race (white omitted), education (college omitted), household size, number of
children aged under 14, and the state unemployment rate. We also control
for state fixed effects and year dummies. The state fixed effects control for
permanent differences across states, such as political preferences for welfare,
59
Bitler et al. (2020, Table 1) show pandemic UI and SNAP participation rates from the same data
source as ours, but for only the short-term unemployed and those who report themselves as furloughed,
instead of all the unemployed. Interestingly, their UI participation rates are higher than ours and their SNAP
participation rates are lower. Our sample includes the longer-term unemployed, many of whom may have
exhausted benefits and who have had more time to access the SNAP programme.
60
The CIS questionnaire inadvertently refers to SSI as ‘Supplemental Social Security’ rather than
Supplemental Security Income, and there appears to be some discrepancy among men in the responses
to SNAP and SSI. Consequently, we are concerned that the SSI response could be more survey response
error than real.
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while the year dummies are necessary to control for common aggregate factors
affecting programme participation, including, but not limited to, businesscycle shocks. This means that the state unemployment rate captures local
deviations from national unemployment rates, and thus may understate the
programme response to the total (state plus aggregate) unemployment rate.
Also, as is well known, the magnitudes of probit coefficients are not directly
interpretable and thus we present marginal effects evaluated at the means
of the regressors, with marginal effects of indicator variables reflecting the
difference in the predicted CDF with the indicator set to 1 and 0, respectively.
We present the direct coefficients in Tables A1 and A2 in the online Appendix,
and summary statistics of regression variables in Table A3. Because the state
unemployment rate is the focal regressor of interest, we cluster the standard
errors at the state level.61
Table 1 presents the marginal effects from the probit models for the
combined 2001–20 survey years. We see that overall programme participation
is U-shaped with respect to age, with younger adults more likely to participate
than those aged 45–54, but those aged 35–44 are less likely to participate
than their older counterparts, though the latter age effect is not statistically
significant at usual significance levels. Looking across columns, it appears
this pattern is driven by Medicaid, and reinforced by SSI. Most Medicaid
recipients are families with young children, consistent with the larger effect
among young adults, but some disabled are also on Medicaid and this is more
likely to affect older adults, as seen in the SSI column. The table also shows
that women are about 2.5 percentage points more likely than men to receive
any programme, and this higher participation among women holds across
all programmes except for UI. Black people are 14 percentage points more
likely to be on social assistance than white people, and Hispanic people are 4
percentage points more likely to be on assistance than non-Hispanic people.
Participation by black people is higher across all programmes, and the same
is true of Hispanic people except for UI and SSI. Programme participation is
strongly decreasing in education attainment. Those with high school or less
are 26 percentage points more likely to be on assistance than those who are
college educated, compared with 17 percentage points for those who have
some college education versus college educated. The programme for which
the marginal effects of high school or less and some college are comparable
in magnitude is UI, underscoring the fact that unlike means-tested transfers,
61

To expand the number of states covered in 2020 in the CIS, we use the regional sample rather than the
national sample in the figures. This increases the number of states represented from 10 to 18. We reproduced
Figure 7 using the regional sample, and while the response of UI and Medicaid during the pandemic is little
changed, we do observe a larger SNAP, TANF and SSI response for those with less than college education in
the regional sample. We believe this is explained in part by the fact that the extra eight states in the regional
CIS are drawn from large metropolitan areas, where SNAP, TANF and SSI participation rates tend to be
higher than average.
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TABLE 1
Marginal effects from probit regression of social assistance programme participation
Variables

Any programme
(1)

UI
(2)

Medicaid
(3)

SNAP
(4)

TANF
(5)

SSI
(6)

Number of children
aged < 14
State unemployment
rate

0.0223
(0.0026)
–0.0026
(0.0020)
0.0246
(0.0023)
0.1430
(0.0047)
0.0341
(0.0081)
0.0438
(0.0099)
0.2619
(0.0057)
0.1677
(0.0045)
–0.0108
(0.0014)
0.0404
(0.0017)
0.0077
(0.0032)

0.0001
(0.0007)
0.0022
(0.0008)
–0.0195
(0.0015)
0.0117
(0.0020)
–0.0077
(0.0012)
–0.0080
(0.0019)
0.0400
(0.0025)
0.0361
(0.0018)
–0.0057
(0.0003)
0.0035
(0.0004)
0.0043
(0.0006)

0.0144
(0.0021)
–0.0019
(0.0012)
0.0401
(0.0009)
0.0949
(0.0035)
0.0360
(0.0076)
0.0309
(0.0083)
0.1843
(0.0027)
0.1143
(0.0019)
–0.0073
(0.0012)
0.0256
(0.0008)
0.0009
(0.0019)

0.0123
(0.0015)
–0.0003
(0.0012)
0.0256
(0.0008)
0.0968
(0.0035)
0.0202
(0.0044)
0.0314
(0.0074)
0.1619
(0.0038)
0.1077
(0.0030)
–0.0044
(0.0014)
0.0269
(0.0009)
0.0050
(0.0008)

0.0017
(0.0002)
0.0009
(0.0003)
0.0063
(0.0003)
0.0094
(0.0006)
0.0019
(0.0007)
0.0015
(0.0012)
0.0135
(0.0005)
0.0095
(0.0004)
–0.0015
(0.0003)
0.0029
(0.0002)
0.0004
(0.0001)

–0.0054
(0.0006)
–0.0028
(0.0004)
0.0058
(0.0004)
0.0209
(0.0012)
0.0031
(0.0010)
–0.0022
(0.0025)
0.0538
(0.0013)
0.0284
(0.0013)
–0.0046
(0.0003)
0.0008
(0.0005)
–0.0003
(0.0003)

Observations
State effects
Year effects

1,355,729
Yes
Yes

1,356,054 1,355,773 1,356,042 1,356,015 1,356,055
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Ages 25–34
Ages 35–44
Female
Black
Other
Hispanic
High school or less
Some college
Household size

Note: The sample consists of adults aged 25–54 from the 2001–19 ASEC and Weeks 1–3 of the CIS. The
CIS sample is the regional sample. Results are weighted using person weights. Standard errors are clustered
at the state level.

the reach of UI is higher up the skill and income distribution. Participation on
social assistance programmes is decreasing in household size, but increasing
in the number of children aged under 14, reflecting the need and subsequent
targeting of assistance to young families.
Finally, Table 1 shows that consistent with the aggregate trends depicted
in Figures 6 and 7, programme participation overall is responsive to
local economic conditions, and this is driven by UI and SNAP. To assist
in interpretation of this relationship, Figure 8 shows how the predicted
probability of programme participation changes as the unemployment rate
increases from 3 to 12 per cent, which captures the range of values in
our sample period (the sample average at 6 per cent). Going from an
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FIGURE 8
Effect of the unemployment rate on programme participation

Source: Authors’ calculations of 2001–19 ASEC and Weeks 1–3 of the CIS. Any social assistance includes
UI, Medicaid, SNAP, TANF and SSI. Results show the effect of changing the unemployment rate on the
predicted probability of participation, holding other variables at their mean values.

unemployment rate of 6 to 9 per cent increases the probability of any
programme participation from 15.7 to 18.1 per cent, increases UI participation
from 4.1 to 5.6 per cent, and increases SNAP from 5.4 to 7.0 per cent. In the
COVID-19 period, however, the United States went from an unemployment
rate of just over 3 per cent to over 14 per cent. Figure 8, which is based
on the subset of those aged 25–54, shows that going from 3 to 12 per cent
unemployment increases programme participation by 7 percentage points
overall, 4 points on UI and 5 points on SNAP. The other programmes in
Figure 8 show no responsiveness to the business cycle.
To see whether the relationship between the macro economy and
programme participation changed in the COVID-19 period, in Table 2 we
redo the analysis but now permit the effect of the state unemployment
rate to differ in the pre-pandemic period and the COVID-19 period.62 Not
62
In earlier analyses, we explored heterogeneity in programme participation by selected demographics
such as race, detailed education, and poverty status. However, sample sizes in the CIS are limited compared
with the ASEC, and thus lack power to robustly identify whether the relationship between socio-economic
characteristics and programme participation changed in the COVID-19 period. We should also note that
these regressions use the regional sample of the CIS whereas Figures 6 and 7 used the national sample.
SNAP, TANF and Medicaid show slightly greater increases in 2020 for the regional sample.
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TABLE 2
Marginal effects from probit regression of social assistance programme participation
with nonlinear 2020 unemployment rate
Variables

Any programme
(1)

UI
(2)

Medicaid
(3)

SNAP
(4)

TANF
(5)

SSI
(6)

Number of children
aged < 14
State unemployment
rate
State unemployment
rate*year = 2020

0.0223
(0.0026)
–0.0026
(0.0020)
0.0247
(0.0023)
0.1430
(0.0047)
0.0340
(0.0081)
0.0438
(0.0099)
0.2619
(0.0057)
0.1677
(0.0045)
–0.0107
(0.0015)
0.0404
(0.0017)
0.0073
(0.0034)
0.0051
(0.0043)

0.0001
(0.0007)
0.0022
(0.0008)
–0.0195
(0.0015)
0.0117
(0.0020)
–0.0077
(0.0012)
–0.0080
(0.0019)
0.0400
(0.0025)
0.0361
(0.0018)
–0.0057
(0.0003)
0.0035
(0.0004)
0.0043
(0.0006)
0.0001
(0.0023)

0.0144
(0.0021)
–0.0019
(0.0012)
0.0401
(0.0009)
0.0948
(0.0035)
0.0359
(0.0076)
0.0309
(0.0083)
0.1844
(0.0027)
0.1144
(0.0019)
–0.0072
(0.0012)
0.0256
(0.0008)
0.0005
(0.0020)
0.0046
(0.0032)

0.0123
(0.0015)
–0.0003
(0.0012)
0.0256
(0.0008)
0.0968
(0.0035)
0.0202
(0.0044)
0.0314
(0.0075)
0.1619
(0.0038)
0.1077
(0.0030)
–0.0044
(0.0014)
0.0269
(0.0009)
0.0049
(0.0010)
0.0018
(0.0023)

0.0017
(0.0002)
0.0009
(0.0003)
0.0063
(0.0003)
0.0093
(0.0006)
0.0019
(0.0007)
0.0015
(0.0012)
0.0135
(0.0005)
0.0095
(0.0004)
–0.0015
(0.0003)
0.0029
(0.0002)
0.0003
(0.0001)
0.0004
(0.0006)

–0.0054
(0.0006)
–0.0028
(0.0004)
0.0058
(0.0004)
0.0209
(0.0012)
0.0031
(0.0010)
–0.0022
(0.0025)
0.0538
(0.0013)
0.0284
(0.0013)
–0.0046
(0.0003)
0.0008
(0.0005)
–0.0003
(0.0003)
0.0002
(0.0007)

Observations
State effects
Year effects

1,355,729
Yes
Yes

1,356,054 1,355,773 1,356,042 1,356,015 1,356,055
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Ages 25–34
Ages 35–44
Female
Black
Other
Hispanic
High school or less
Some college
Household size

Note: The sample consists of adults aged 25–54 from the 2001–19 ASEC and Weeks 1–3 of the CIS. The
CIS sample is the regional sample. Results are weighted using person weights. Standard errors are clustered
at the state level.

surprisingly, the partial effects of the socio-economic characteristics in Table 2
are unchanged from Table 1, but the unemployment interaction coefficients
are of interest. While the unemployment rate increase in the COVID-19 period
shows a stronger business-cycle effect in overall safety net participation, and
the interaction coefficients for individual programmes are positive and often
sizeable in magnitude relative to the pre-pandemic coefficients (especially for
Medicaid and TANF), the effects are not statistically significant at usual levels.
This implies that the increases in programme participation in 2020 shown
in Figure 6, which are greater than in prior downturns, are no greater than
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would be expected on the basis of the greater increase in the unemployment
rate during the pandemic. However, this result should be qualified both by
the relatively modest sample sizes in the 2020 CIS data, which reduce the
power of the analysis, and the difference in programme participation in the
pre-2020 and 2020 periods which, as we have already noted, could bias the
interaction coefficient downward.63 In sum, with the exceptions of UI and
SNAP, the safety net programmes considered here demonstrate little buoyancy
with respect to state business cycles. In the next section, we consider possible
reform to strengthen UI and SNAP, as well as to introduce changes to some
other programmes on order to offer greater access and coverage to the safety
net during economic downturns.

VII. Reform options for the US safety net
The descriptive evidence presented here highlights the shortcomings of the US
social safety net to respond to economic and health crises, and points to several
areas for reform. In this section, we emphasise two areas, one a system of
automatic triggers targeted to negative business-cycle shocks, and the other to
an expansion of programme access and generosity to non-covered and undercovered populations during both good and bad economic times.
Under current practice, during economic downturns, the expansion of
programme access and benefit generosity and duration requires an explicit
act of Congress. An exemplar of this flawed process is the UI programme.
Under normal conditions, a qualifying individual is eligible for UI benefits
for up to 26 weeks, though there are some states that cap that at a lower
level. Since 1970, there has been the Extended Benefits programme that
provides anywhere from 13 to 20 additional weeks of UI benefits, conditional
on the national and state insured unemployment rates reaching a certain
‘trigger’ threshold.64 The problem with this programme is that half the
benefits must be paid by the states but states are typically financially strapped
during recessions.65 In the Great Recession, Congress authorised the federal
government to pay 100 per cent; implementing such a rule in this recession
would appear to be a meritorious reform.
During the Great Recession, Congress passed the Emergency
Unemployment Compensation Programme whereby all additional benefits
63
A recent working paper by Hembre (2020) using administrative caseload data finds a comparably sized
response in both TANF and SNAP to changes in state unemployment rates.
64
There has been much discussion in the United States about whether the triggers are too stringent; see,
for example, Bauer, Edelberg and Parsons (2020).
65
US states have budget rules that require them to have balanced budgets on operating expenses (i.e.
excluding capital expenses) but UI spending is exempt from the requirement. Nevertheless, state tax
revenues fall and state safety net expenditures rise during recessions, making it difficult for states to spend
more on UI.
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were paid out of federal funds. A similar provision was invoked during the
COVID-19 pandemic. The problem is that this requires Congress to enact
legislation, but as the drama unfolding as of this writing demonstrates, this
is far from a given. The initial $600 per week bonus UI payment expired at
the end of July 2020 and Congress has not reached agreement on whether
to extend the programme, and if so by how much, despite the fact that
unemployment rates remain in excess of 10 per cent. Not only does the
legislative process result in gaps in coverage, it creates uncertainty for
workers, which probably has effects on job search and decisions on whether
to take jobs or not, and on their decisions on spending now versus saving for
later.
A clear workaround is to reform the Extended Benefits programme by fully
federally funding the additional weeks of eligibility with a revamped series of
automatic triggers that turn on and off when established thresholds are crossed.
The extended UI programme should not only federally fund additional weeks
of benefits, but also the dollar amounts owing to the low wage replacement
rates in state UI programmes. But there are more fundamental reforms in
UI that should be considered. One is the cross-state differences in generosity,
which could be reduced by a floor established for all states. These differences
are partly the result of differences in tax bases across states as well, which
could be addressed by federal subsidies to states with low tax bases who find
it more difficult to establish programmes of minimally acceptable generosity.
All the reforms we suggest require heavier federal involvement and regulation
of the programme, which seems to be the only way to address the evident
problems with the programme revealed by the pandemic.
SNAP has functioned well overall as an automatic stabiliser, but there
are several incremental changes that could improve programme coverage and
generosity. As part of the 1996 welfare reform, the programme introduced
a 20 hour per week work requirement for so-called ABAWDS, able-bodied
adults without dependents. This work requirement can be suspended if local
employment conditions deteriorate above a certain level, but states must
request a waiver. The programme would operate more efficiently and equitably
if that state discretion was removed and the local employment conditions
served as an automatic trigger for eligibility. Likewise, other automatic
triggers that would improve programme effectiveness are suspension of asset
tests during downturns, expansion of gross-income eligibility limits, extension
of recertification intervals, and expansion of benefit generosity. The liquid
asset limit of $2,250 for eligibility has only been increased by $250 since
the early 1980s, and precludes many low- and moderate-income families from
participating. The limits should be raised, and suspended automatically during
economic downturns. Programme participants without earnings generally
must recertify every six months, but those with earnings often recertify every
three months. This should be extended to at least six months during recessions,
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and perhaps could be staggered to increase even longer based on the severity
of the recession. During the Great Recession, the maximum SNAP benefit was
increased by 13 per cent, and this resulted in reduced food insecurity.66 There
should be an automatic trigger that temporarily raises benefit levels during
downturns.
Unlike SNAP, the TANF programme requires more fundamental reform
to make it more responsive to economic crises. As shown in Figure 8, the
programme is completely unresponsive to recessionary periods, which was not
the experience of its predecessor, Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
When TANF was established, a $2 billion contingency fund was created
that states could tap into once certain triggers were met, but the fund was
depleted during the Great Recession and while Congress has made upward
of $600 million available subsequently in each year, it is typically depleted
by April and not replenished until the next fiscal year.67 However, Congress
did at least provide some emergency funding to the programme in the Great
Recession, but did not do so in prior recessions and has not done so during the
pandemic. Thus, similar to the UI Extended Benefits programme, Congress
could establish a TANF Extended Benefits programme that is fully federally
funded and automatically accessible once certain labour market thresholds
are crossed. These automatic triggers could also initiate a series of changes
to programme operations, including the suspension of time limits, work
requirements and benefit sanctioning procedures, along with a federal top-up
of cash assistance. Currently, federal law greatly limits the ability of states
to relax those rules during recessions even if the state desires to. General
cash assistance is all but non-existent in the United States, and thus additional
federally provided cash support for low-income families with young children
via the TANF programme could go a long way to reduce income volatility
during downturns.
In addition to reforms that improve programme effectiveness over the
business cycle, there are a number of incremental reforms to improve general
programme coverage. Historically, the UI programme has not covered parttime workers, the self-employed or independent contractors. During the Great
Recession, a handful of states extended coverage to part-time workers, but not
to the other groups. Congress did provide coverage to all three groups during
the initial COVID-19 legislation, but this coverage is slated to end this year.
Thus, the programme should be reformed to permanently cover this growing
share of the labour force, or at least to offer coverage to those groups at a price.
Another problem widely noted in the US media concerning the UI response to
the pandemic is that many states have IT systems that are decades behind the
technological curve, which caused major delays in processing applications.
66
67

Nord and Prell, 2011.
Falk, 2016.
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This is not surprising as states do not have the incentive to make capital
investments when they are barely able to raise enough revenues to pay benefits.
Federal subsidies to states to invest in upgrades should be on the table.
COVID-19 also exposed a major tear in the US safety net, with health
insurance for many tied to their employer. The expansion of Medicaid
in the ACA substantially reduced rates of non-insured, but 10 per cent
of the population remain without coverage. The Supreme Court ruled
unconstitutional the requirement that states expand Medicaid, and thus
13 states still have not extended coverage. One possible reform is to
permanently increase the cost sharing if states extend coverage, in order
to provide additional incentives for states to adopt the expansion. A more
fundamental reform would be to enact some form of single payer insurance or
public option to guarantee coverage to all, regardless of state of residence.
These reforms, both those directly aimed at cyclical responsiveness as
well as those indirectly aimed through general increases in coverage, do not
constitute a trivial commitment of resources. But failure to enact some or all
of these and similar changes will leave the US safety net still with gaping holes
that leave many families insufficiently assisted during downturns and even
during normal economic times. This will lead to the same problems occurring
again in the next recession.

Supporting information
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting
Information section at the end of the article.
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